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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of non-conscious vs. deliberate ways
of making decisions in a dynamic decision-making task. An experimental setting is used to study
this question; three experimental groups are distinguished: immediate decision-making (only very
limited time for deliberate cognitive processing), considerate decision-making (relatively long time
for deliberate cognitive processing), and distracted decision-making (time for non-conscious cognitive
processing only). As experimental stimulus, a simulator based on the Kaibab Plateau model was
employed. With a sample size of more than 100 experimental participants, group differences are
not significant for most data examined. Implications comprise the formulation of a framework to
guide further research. The value of this paper lies in the fact that it connects to a recent discussion in
psychology and transfers it to a domain in the core interest of the system community: decision-making
in situations with dynamic complexity. Furthermore, it offers a range of improvement points for
potential follow-up studies.
Keywords: dynamic decision-making; non-conscious cognitive processing; dynamic complexity;
experiment; exploratory study
1. Introduction
The motivation for this paper came from the question of whether we—as researchers of
decision-making—would recommend that managers decide “straight from the gut” [1] or “don’t
trust your gut” [2]. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of non-conscious vs.
conscious ways of making decisions in a dynamic decision-making task. More specifically, we wanted
to initially ask the question of whether humans perform better when they have substantial time
available to think about a dynamic problem, or when time for deliberate consideration is limited. The
time to make a decision can be limited because decisions have to be made immediately or because
individuals are distracted during their deliberation time.
In the light of some recent findings in psychology, and according to some anecdotal evidence, it
seems that non-conscious forms of decision-making are more effective than deliberate forms more
often than expected by proponents of rational problem solving. However, these findings were often
achieved when static and single tasks had been involved. Therefore, in accordance with the theme of
this special issue in dynamic decision-making in controlled experiments, we wanted to investigate the
effectiveness of deliberate vs. non-conscious cognitive processing on decision-making in a dynamic
context and derive first insights on the domain of dynamic decision-making that subsequently could
be used for advanced studies.
To this end, this paper has four more sections. In the second section, we review the status of
the (mostly psychological) literature on deliberate vs. non-conscious decision-making. Furthermore,
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characteristics of dynamic tasks are briefly explained; it is indicated that most experiments on the
deliberate/non-conscious difference employ static and single decision tasks. In the third section, the
design of an experiment is presented that should help to get preliminary insights on the effects of
non-conscious cognitive processing in environments where dynamic complexity is high. In the fourth
section, we present and discuss the results of this experiment. The paper closes with a section that
discusses implications for further research by formulating a framework for advanced studies in this
domain and concrete recommendations for future experiments.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Evidence in Favor of Non-Conscious Deliberation When Making Decisions
Over the last decades, non-conscious cognitive processing of information and subsequent
decision-making has received substantial attention in psychological research [3–11]. While authors
use different terminology (“intuitive”, “unconscious”, “recognition-primed”, “deliberation without
attention”, or “thinking without thinking”), they all describe the same phenomenon: making decisions
without conscious consideration of what the best decision would be. In this paper, we use the term
“non-conscious cognitive processing in decision-making” to refer to this phenomenon. Therefore,
the expression of the decision happens consciously, but the preceding cognitive processes are not
consciously related to the decision that has to be made. Note that such decision-making is not “magical”
or “random” but that people have acquired the ability to make non-conscious decisions over years of
being busy with a subject [9].
Wilson [6] illustrates the crucial part that non-conscious cognitive processes play with an example
of a man who loses his sense of proprioception (i.e. the sense of the relative position of body parts).
With a great deal of effort, the patient had to replace non-conscious proprioception with conscious
control of his body. Whenever his concentration was lost, he would lose control over his body and end
up “in a heap of tangled limbs on the floor”.
On the basis of experimental as well as real world purchase decisions, Dijksterhuis and
colleagues [12,13] conclude that non-conscious thinkers are better able to make the best choice among
complex products. Conscious thinkers are better able to make the best choice among simple products.
Popular books such as Blink [14] maintain that expert decision-making is often instantaneous, difficult
to access by conscious processes and in specific circumstances leads to high-quality decisions.
A classic example of expert decision-making, reported by Simon as early as 1957, already relates
to this debate. He studies a chess player who tries to decide on the next move in a game, an activity
that is thought to involve a highly analytical approach. Expert chess players indicate that good moves
usually come to mind after a few seconds of looking at the board, after which considerable time is
spent on verifying that the move does not have hidden weaknesses [15]. Therefore, although a decision
comes to mind almost immediately, an analytical and time-consuming process is used to check this first
available option; this analysis may reveal that the first option is not beneficial and should be replaced
by another move. Simon [15] describes how in a situation of stress, for example, intuitive decisions
may be based on “primitive urges” such as the need to reduce embarrassment or guilt. Research in
biases and heuristics [16–19] shows convincingly that human judgment is biased in systematic ways.
Gigerenzer and colleagues argue that the same simplifying heuristics that are responsible for
cognitive biases are the cognitive mechanisms “that make us smart” [20]. Only because they allow
us to make fast decisions that are frugal in the sense that they do not require much information as
input, we are able to survive in a complex world. Thus, Gigerenzer assumes that non-conscious
cognitive processing is a basic characteristic and success factor of human beings. Based on these
claims, Mortensen et al. [21] claim that decision-makers should be advised to rely on non-conscious
information processing when making difficult decisions.
In summary, we can conclude that—despite all the biases and heuristics related to human
decision-making and all claims by proponents of rational decision-making—there is evidence that
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non-conscious processing of information for decision-making is effective on some occasions. This
paper tries to shed some additional light in the context of dynamic tasks, which differ from the static,
single tasks mostly used in experiments of decision-making.
2.2. Decision-Making in Dynamic Environments
Individual decision-making in dynamic systems differs from static tasks, which are mostly used
when non-conscious processing in decision-making is studied. We define dynamic decision-making as
characterized by three features:
1. A series of decisions has to be made, not just one (repeated decision-making);
2. The system’s state changes over time based on past decisions; and
3. There is some element of time pressure involved, although not all individuals subjectively
experience it to the same degree.
Thus, the current state of a dynamic decision-making environment depends on the past system
states and the decisions that have been made in the past.
The distinction between static and dynamic decision-making is related to the different types
of complexity people in decision situations experience. In this regard, detail complexity and
dynamic complexity can be differentiated [22,23]. Detail complexity can be divided further into
three sub-components: the number of elements in a system, the number of connections between
elements, and the types of functional relations between elements [24]. The dynamic component
of complexity comprises the variability of a system’s behavior over time, and the variability of a
system’s structure (assuming that a system can stay the same when its structure changes as long as its
underlying goal set is not substantially modified; cf. [25]). An important proposition for this study
is that, in dynamic decision-making, effects of dynamic complexity are prevalent that do not exist in
static decision-making situations. Thus, static and dynamic decision-making might have different
characteristics and success strategies due to the effects of dynamic complexity in the latter.
In several fields of expertise, decision makers confronted with time pressure and uncertainty
typically carried out the first course of action that came to their mind. This idea is similar to Simon’s
assertion that “intuition and judgment—at least good judgment—are simply analyses frozen into
habit” [15] (p. 63). This process, also termed “recognition-primed” decision-making, actually consists
of a range of strategies. In its simplest form, the strategy comes down to seizing up the situation
and responding with the initial option identified. If the situation is not clear, the decision maker
may supplement this strategy by mentally simulating the events leading up to the situation. In a
situation that is changing continuously, a different kind of simulation may be applied as well. Here,
the proposed plan of action is mentally simulated to see if unintended consequences arise that are
unacceptable. In a review study, Klein [26] considers the conditions under which recognition-primed
decision-making appears to be appropriate: when the decision maker has considerable expertise
relevant to the situation at hand and is under time-pressure, and when there is uncertainty and/or
goals are ill-defined. Recognition-primed decision-making is less likely to be used with combinatorial
problems when a justification for the decision is required, and when the views of different stakeholders
have to be taken into account.
We understand dynamic decision-making as falling into the first category: We study individual
decision-making, stakeholders are not considered, and there is no need to explain (or justify) decisions.
By definition, dynamic tasks involve a degree of time pressure and uncertainty about the system’s
future, which are each based on the dynamic complexity of the situation and the difficulties people
have with estimating developments over time [27]. Thus, it seems conceivable that for individuals
confronted with dynamic problems, non-conscious processing or recognition-primed decision-making
is the preferred approach [28,29], which is in contrast to the more “classical” assumption that in
such cases conscious reasoning and critical deliberation is beneficial [30,31]. While the literature is
not unanimous when it comes to empirical support for one or the other view based on the usually
Systems 2016, 4, 13 4 of 11
employed static tasks [32,33], we for now consider the arguments of the non-conscious decision-making
group as worthwhile enough to base our study of dynamic decision-making on.
In summary, in dynamic situations decision-makers do not only experience the effects of detail
complexity as frequently happening in static tasks. In addition, dynamic complexity plays an important
role and might hamper effective decision-making. Thus, the initial assumption of this research is the
advantage of non-conscious cognitive processing of information in decision-making for dynamic tasks.
We want to explore in a pilot study whether the assumed superiority of non-conscious decision-making
in static tasks also holds for dynamic tasks or whether a thorough consideration of the situation
is required.
3. Experimental Section
We explore whether non-conscious deliberation of the situation is superior to deliberate
consideration in dynamic decision-making with the help of a pilot laboratory experiment with three
experimental groups. In Group 1, subjects have to start making decisions right after the task has
been introduced to them (“immediate condition”). Group 2 is the experimental group that represents
conscious decision-making (“consideration condition”). Subjects in this group are given three minutes
to contemplate about the task before they are allowed to start with actually working on the task. In
experimental Group 3, non-conscious decision-making is tested (“distracted condition”). Subjects in
this group are also not allowed to start using the simulator immediately but have to wait for three
minutes. However, in contrast to the consideration condition, they are occupied by another cognitive
task during this time (in our case, solving simple Sudoku puzzles). All subjects work individually and
communication with other participants is not allowed. A timetable of the experiment is depicted in
Table 1, which is the result of two trial runs of the experiment with colleagues and students.
Table 1. Timetable of experiment.
Time (min) Immediate Condition(Exp. Group 1)
Consideration Condition
(Exp. Group 2)
Distraction Condition
(Exp. Group 3)
0 Welcome Welcome Welcome
2 Instruction Instruction Instruction
10 X1
Y1 Z1
20
Break
23 break break
25 X2
Y2 Z2
35
Break
38 break break
40 KnowledgeT KnowledgeT KnowledgeT
50 Bio Bio Bio
55 Debrief Debrief Debrief
60 End end end
Instruction: explain task to subjects, clarify how to use the simulator. X1, X2: two game runs, 50 decisions each,
with limited decision time (“immediate condition”); Y1, Y2: two game runs, 50 decisions each, with time to
consider task before round 1 (“consideration condition”); Z1, Z2: two game runs, 50 decisions each, with time
in which subjects are distracted before round 1 (“distraction condition”); KnowledgeT: test of knowledge about
the system; Bio: Biographical data (sex, age, studies, experience, etc.); Debrief: short explanation of experiment
to subjects.
We use a computer simulation as dynamic task in the experiment [34], which is based on the
Kaibab Plateau system dynamics model. This model is well documented in the literature [35]—Figure 1
depicts the overshoot and collapse behavior of a deer population which is represented in the model
(for a structural explanation of overshoot and collapse cf. [22]). The model is based on real events,
happening in the Kaibab national park in Arizona between 1900 and 1950. Thus, in the figure, estimated
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historical data is shown as well; differences to the simulation outcomes are due to estimations (in the
model as well as in the real data) and factors not considered in the model, for instance volatile weather
conditions. This Kaibab model has been used in a variety of educational settings. Examples include
explaining dynamic complexity resulting from feedback loops [36–38] and unintended consequences of
human policies in ecological systems [39]; the human interference with nature was the quasi extinction
of predators of deer in the years between 1907 and 1920: cougars, wolves, and coyotes.
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In the simulation, the model is used with one extension: Now, users can decide—for each
simulated year—on a “harvest rate” of deer (meaning either the hunting of deer or the transfer of
deer to other regions). By sensibly controlling the number of deer, it is possible to avoid the enormous
increase of deer and the subsequent collapse of the population due to too little food available. The deer
harvest rate is the only decision users have to make. The user interface of the simulator is depicted in
Figure 2. The model is developed using Vensim [40]; the user interface is programmed in Sable [41]
(for another version of a Kaibab simulator see [42]; in their simulator the number of predators can be
controlled by subjects as well). The goal for subjects is to stabilize the deer population on the highest
level possible over the total simulation run.
Subjects were students in a course in the business administration bachelor program at a Dutch
university. They were told that participating in the experiment is part of the course; however, it was
made clear that performance in the experiment would not influence grading. Subjects’ performance
was assessed based on a score that combines the stability of the population with the populations’
height, aggregated over all 50 simulated years. Thus, performance is the average number of deer
divided by the standard deviation of the population from the average. This score is in line with the
actual goals of natural reserve authorities: On the one hand, they want to maintain a reasonable high
number of individuals of a species to secure genetic diversity and to hedge the population against
infrequent but not impossible extreme natural conditions (e.g., very harsh winters). On the other
hand, the stability in the number of a species minimizes amplifying negative effects on other species
(e.g., in a predator-prey situation).
By definition, dynamic tasks take a certain period of time to be completed because several
decisions have to be made, and effects only occur after some time. Thus, we assume our results to be
affected in two ways:
1. Differences between the experimental groups are expected be rather small. During the
50 simulation rounds that the subjects play per experimental run, in all experimental conditions,
there is some time for non-conscious processing of information while working on the task.
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For instance, subjects in the distraction condition will not be distracted during the time of
actually working with the simulation; subjects in the immediate condition have some time
for non-conscious cognitive processing; subjects in the consideration condition have some
extra non-conscious cognitive processing time. We discuss this point again in the final section
of this paper as the systematic issue of dynamic decision-making research when it comes to
non-conscious decisions.
2. Following the reasoning in 1, we assume that differences between groups will become smaller in
the course of the experiment. In particular, differences in experimental run 2 should be much
smaller (or even non-existent) compared to experimental run 1.
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4. Results and Discussion
In the experiment, which was conducted in 2008, 120 subjects took part. After eliminating
18 cases due to missing or incomplete data, the following group sizes were achieved: immediate
condition n = 41, consideration condition n = 30, distraction condition n = 31. In total, 58 subjects were
male, 44 were female; the age of subjects ranged from 19 to 30, with the average at about 21. No subject
reported to have known the Kaibab Plateau task before. Since subjects were randomly assigned to
a time slot, and time slots were randomly allocated to an experimental condition, we assume that
experimental groups are randomly composed. We assume that groups were equal with regard to the
purpose of our experiment: All subjects are Business Administration students in their second year;
there are no statistical differences regarding age or gender distribution between groups. At the end
of the experiment, subjects were asked about the perceived degree of difficulty of the task, the time
pressure they experienced, and their estimation of the realism of the task. Like with the biographical
data, none of these items showed significant differences between experimental groups.
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Results of subjects in terms of average deer population are far from optimal. As Sterman [43]
indicates, a deer population of 32,000 can be sustained without substantial fluctuations. In comparison
to this, the average population size over all subjects in the experiment is 9433 for the first run and 11,505
for the second run. While one can find a significant increase of the average size of the deer population
from run 1 to run 2, it goes along with a significantly larger standard deviation. In other words, while
subjects manage to increase the average population size, fluctuations around the mean increase as
well, an indication for the common overshoot-and-collapse behavior of the system. Accordingly, the
performance score (mean/standard deviation) is not significantly different between the first and the
second run over all subjects.
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of an analysis of variance for the first and the second run,
respectively. We tested the between group differences for the three experimental groups for the
performance score. For both runs, within group differences are much bigger than between group
differences. There are no statistically significant differences between the three experimental groups
concerning the performance score (in both simulator runs).
Table 2. ANOVA results for performance score in first simulation run.
Summary
Groups Count Sum Mean Variance Median
immediate 41 232.133 5.661 85.836 2.243
consideration 30 207.248 6.908 139.573 2.678
distraction 31 200.411 6.464 109.087 2.235
ANOVA
Differences SquareSums df
Mean
Square Sum F p Critical F
between
groups 28.564 2 14.282 0.131 0.876 3.088
within
groups 10,753.692 99 108.623
total 10,782.257 101
Table 3. ANOVA results for performance score in second simulation run.
Summary
Groups Count Sum Mean Variance Median
immediate 41 290.228 7.078 193.708 2.209
consideration 30 163.887 5.462 50.942 2.687
distraction 31 177.168 5.715 48.492 2.139
ANOVA
Differences SquareSums df
Mean
Square Sum F p Critical F
between
groups 55.235 2 27.617 0.255 0.774 3.088
within
groups 10,680.439 99 107.883
total 10,735.675 101
In the knowledge test conducted at the end of the experiment, subjects had to answer twelve
questions concerning their understanding and recollection of the task (shown in the appendix). Each
correct answer was coded as one point, leading to a maximum of twelve points in the knowledge test.
An analysis of variances between groups for results in the test indicates group differences. In order to
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find out which groups differed from each other and what the direction of the differences is, we ran
T-tests that are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. T-test results for knowledge test.
Distraction Consideration Distraction Immediate Consideration Immediate
mean 7.806 7.467 7.806 8.634 7.467 8.634
variance 3.428 2.051 3.428 2.088 2.051 2.088
n 31 30 31 41 30 41
pooled
variance 2.751 2.662 2.072
df 59 70 69
t value 0.800 ´2.131 ´3.376
P (T ď t)
double-sided 0.427 0.037 0.001
critical t-value
(double sided) 2.001 1.994 1.995
Between the distraction and the consideration group, no statistical differences can be found.
However, there are significant differences between the immediate and the distraction group, and
between the immediate and the consideration group. In both cases, subjects in the immediate group
scored better in the knowledge test than subjects in the other groups.
A qualitative inspection of subjects’ results indicates that the fewest overshoot-and-collapse
behavior modes are to be found for the distraction group (since effects are probably biggest in round 1,
only this round is considered): 7 out of 31 (22.6%) subjects showed the typical boom-and-bust cycle.
However, for the consideration group, 10 out of 30 (33.3%) showed a collapse, and, for the immediate
group, 15 out of 41 (36.6%).
5. Conclusions
The results of our experiment justify a variety of further evaluations. Most strikingly, no
differences between groups could be found. Although this result might simply represent a fact
(i.e. there are no differences between conscious or non-conscious decision-making in dynamic tasks),
we assume—based on the apparent differences for other types of tasks and on the theoretical
considerations presented in the literature section—that it is more likely an artifact of the experimental
design and of characteristics of the task that we used. Therefore, this section discusses explanations for
our findings, resulting in a framework for future research and possible changes in experimental designs.
5.1. A Framework for Researching Non-Conscious Dynamic Decision Making
Since subjects’ performance does not significantly increase from run 1 to run 2, no learning seems
to have taken place. While subjects achieve a higher average deer population in the second run, the
standard deviation increases as well. We hypothesize that subjects are not able to comprehend the
structure of the system and that they cannot deduct and control the corresponding behavior mode
(overshoot-and-collapse).
Thus, concerning the nonexistent group differences for task performance, our assumption is
that the experimental setting was not differentiating enough between groups. First, the 3-min time
span for consideration or distraction might simply be too short, compared to the total duration of the
experiment and the complexity of the task. Second, the nature of dynamic tasks makes it difficult to
prevent all subjects from either consciously or non-consciously processing task information during the
game run since a dynamic task takes a while by definition (and, during this time, experimental groups
cannot be treated differently anymore). Therefore, we identify a systematic issue here of experimental
research in dynamic decision-making when it comes to non-conscious decision-making.
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Another point to consider is the complexity of the task. While structurally not too simple
(consisting of more than a dozen feedback loops, two integration structures—deer and food—and
some non-linear relationships—for instance, the food regeneration time), participants in two pre-tests
considered the task to be understandable. However, there is obviously a substantial gap between
knowing what one should do in principle, and actually doing it by controlling a dynamic system that
is not open for detailed inspection (only behavior graphs and the principle system structure is shown).
Based on these general insights derived from our exploratory experiment and literature review,
we infer that the effects of different decision-making styles (non-conscious vs. deliberate) might be
strongly moderated by task characteristics, most notably the structural complexity of the dynamic
system used in the task. Future research in this domain should therefore take task characteristics and
system complexity explicitly into account. We summarize this finding in the conceptual model shown
in Figure 3 and formulate the following propositions for future studies:
1. Decision-making style (non-conscious vs. deliberate) affects performance in a dynamic
decision-making task
2. Due to the nature of dynamic decision-making, the effect of decision-making style on
performance in a dynamic decision-making task is relatively small between experimental groups
(systematic issue)
3. The effect of decision-making style on performance in a dynamic decision-making task is strongly
moderated by task characteristics
4. Among the task characteristics that strongly moderate the effect of decision-making style on
performance in a dynamic decision-making task, structural complexity of the underlying system
plays an important role
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5.2. Adjust ents to Experi ental esign in Potential Subsequent Studies
In the analysis of our data, we found one significant difference between experimental
groups—which is the difference for the knowledge test. The direction of the difference (the immediate
group scored better than both the consideration and the distraction group) is counter-intuitive.
The group that had the least possibility to cognitively process information about the tasks (either
consciously or unconsciously) scored best. We can only explain this in terms of a shorter over-all
assessment time (subjects being more concentrated and motivated) and with a shorter time from
reading the instruction until filling-out the test questionnaire. Since some of the questions are
just testing the recollection of facts, a shorter time span might aid in the recalling of these facts.
In subsequent research, timings for the asking of the knowledge questions should be harmonized
between groups.
Mitigating the systematic issue of non-conscious processing during periods of instructions (which
inevitably blur the differences between experimental groups) is more difficult. One suggestion in this
Systems 2016, 4, 13 10 of 11
regard would be that subjects in the consideration group have to verbally explain all their decisions
and that subjects in the distraction group must solve a brief, unrelated “distraction puzzle” before
their decisions.
The last improvement point for future experimental designs concerns the performance score that
we used. We gave subjects a verbal goal to achieve (“stabilize the deer population on the highest
possible level”); however, we did not explain in detail how their performance is measured and did not
display the performance score explicitly during the simulation. Related to this, we assume that making
the simulation more “transparent” (by providing information about the system structure) might help
subjects achieving a better result. However, we question whether this would be more realistic and
whether it would interfere with the experimental setting because subjects would then need time to
explore the system, during which non-conscious processing of information could take place in all
groups. Thus, it would add to the systematic issue of on-going non-conscious processing in dynamic
decision-making.
In summary, we believe we address a relevant question. Extending the existing research about
non-conscious decision-making to dynamic tasks is worthwhile, since most decision settings in
reality are dynamic and research shows that individuals can deal insufficiently with dynamics.
However, further attempts have to be made to investigate the effects of conscious vs. non-conscious
decision-making using an experimental research design. Such subsequent experiments can also include
the participation of non-student subjects, such as decision-makers in companies, and the effects of
making decisions in groups (including communication) on decision quality.
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